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Covered Farm Mortgage Bonds in the Late Nineteenth Century U.S. 
 
Abstract 
Covered mortgage bonds have been used successfully in Europe for two centuries, but failed 
in the U.S. when introduced as farm mortgage debentures in the 1880s. Using firm-level data 
and a sample of loans made by one Kansas mortgage company, I find that debenture programs 
grew out of established loan brokerage operations and were used to fund mortgages that were 
difficult to broker because of size, term or risk characteristics. Debentures broadened access to 
the interregional mortgage market and facilitated an expansion of western farm mortgage debt 
before the innovation failed in the mortgage crisis of the 1890s. 
 
 
“[T]he availability of affordable mortgage financing is essential to turning the corner on the current 
housing crisis…. One option we have looked at extensively is covered bonds, which … have the 
potential to increase mortgage financing, improve underwriting standards, and strengthen U.S. 
financial institutions....” 
Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson 




Covered mortgage bonds are debt instruments that are collateralized by a dedicated pool of 
mortgage loans that the issuer holds on its own balance sheet.  The familiar mortgage-backed security 
(MBS) used in the modern U.S. mortgage market, in contrast, is issued against a pool of mortgages that 
have been taken off the balance sheet of the institution that originated the loans.
1  As the MBS market 
experienced severe distress in 2007 and 2008, the U.S. Department of the Treasury urged market 
participants to consider covered bonds as an alternative mechanism for funding mortgages.
2  Secretary 
Paulson recommended this form of finance because issuers of covered bonds keep more “skin in the 
game” than participants in MBS structures and so have stronger incentives to maintain strict loan 
underwriting standards.  In making its recommendation the Treasury also pointed to a 200-year record of 
success with covered bonds in continental European mortgage markets.  This paper offers a different 
perspective by examining the second of three unsuccessful attempts to introduce covered bonds into the 
                                                 
1 Payments on a MBS are guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, a government-sponsored enterprise, or by credit structures that 
developed by a private label issuer. The U.S. Treasury (“Best Practices” pp. 9-10) and Rosen (“What are covered 
Bonds?”) compare all the contractual features of the MBS and covered mortgage bonds.   
2 No covered mortgage bonds have been issued in the U.S. since Secretary Paulsen’s 2008 statement, but the 
Treasury’s legislative recommendations (U.S. Treasury “Regulatory Reform”) include capital requirements for 
securitizations that are consistent with the development of a covered mortgage bond market. 2 
 
U.S. mortgage market before 1930—the “farm mortgage debenture movement” of the 1880s.
3  The goal is 
to explain how the innovation was successfully brought to market, to identify the contribution covered 
bonds made to the integration of the national farm mortgage market, and to assess the role that debentures 
played in the western farm mortgage crisis of the 1890s when nearly every company that had issued the 
new security failed.     
Before 1880 western farm mortgage lending was dominated by mortgage companies that 
originated loans in the Midwest and Great Plains and then brokered the whole loans to investors in the 
northeast and Europe.  In the 1880s some of these companies began to place mortgages into trust accounts 
and to issue bonds (called debentures) against this security.  An important feature of the debenture 
movement is that the introduction of these new securities did not simply displace brokerage; instead, the 
two funding methods were used side-by-side within the same markets and even by the same mortgage 
companies.  
The key to understanding the farm debenture movement as a financial innovation, therefore, is to 
explain why only some mortgage companies issued covered mortgage bonds and why they were used to 
fund only some mortgages. The explanation offered here focuses on differences in how risk was shared 
and how loans were marketed under debentures and brokerage.  I argue that only well-established 
mortgage companies could bear the additional risk that was involved in issuing debentures and that the 
innovation was then used to fund mortgages that were particularly difficult and costly to broker. These 
observations are developed in the first section of the paper and then tested empirically on balance sheet 
data for an 1890 cross-section of western mortgage companies and on an 1887 sample of  individual 
mortgage loans that were either brokered or placed behind  debentures by the J.B. Watkins Mortgage 
Company of Lawrence, Kansas.   
                                                 
3 H.P. Brewer (“Eastern Money”) documents unsuccessful attempts by eastern investment bankers and life insurance 
companies to develop covered mortgage bond programs in the 1870s.  D.M. Frederiksen (“Mortgage Banking” and 
“Mortgage Banking in”) provides an account of the debenture movement examined here.  Snowden (“Mortgage 
Securitization”) examines both episodes in a history of mortgage securitization in the U.S. before 1930. 3 
 
The Watkins loan sample also provides an unusual opportunity to explore Secretary Paulsen’s 
claim that covered mortgage bonds provide their issuers with strong incentives to maintain strict loan 
underwriting standards.  It turns out that debentures created a new asymmetry of information in the 
mortgage market because investors observed less about the loans that were placed behind these bonds 
than they did about whole mortgage loans that were brokered.  The asymmetry provided mortgage 
companies with an opportunity to apply different loan underwriting standards in the two markets and I 
find that Watkins used his debenture program to fund loans on which credit risk and lending costs were 
higher than on the brokered loans he sold outright to investors.  I conclude, therefore, that the introduction 
of covered mortgage bonds broadened the western farm mortgage market and contributed to its rapid 
expansion just before the onset of the western agricultural mortgage crisis of the 1890s. The demise of the 
farm debenture movement provides a cautionary lesson about the stability and incentives for credit risk 
management within covered mortgage bond programs as we once again consider introducing the innovation 
into the U.S. mortgage market.  
 
Farm Mortgage Banking in the 1880s:  From Loan Brokerage to Debentures   
The background to the debenture movement of the 1880s was a pattern of significant regional 
differentials in mortgage rates during the late nineteenth century that ranged from under six percent in the 
savings-rich northeast to ten percent or higher in the Great Plains, south and west.  Lance Davis first 
identified these differentials as part of a broad pattern of capital market segmentation and later investigations 
found that variation in the cost of mortgage credit across space were driven in large part by differences in 
mortgage lending risk and in the transactions costs associated with lending across regional boundaries.
4  Both 
sources of differentials provided opportunit ies for arbitrage that were taken up by a cadre of specialized 
mortgage companies that appeared in burgeoning agricultural areas to sell  western loans to investors in 
                                                 
4  Following Davis (“The Investment Market”), Eichengreen (“Mortgage Rates”) and Snowden (“Mortgage Rates”) used 
different data and methods to investigate the premium in western farm mortgage rates.    4 
 
eastern and European markets.
5 Mortgage companies did so by providing  distant investors with an entire 
bundle of services.  They hired and supervised loan agents who located borrowers, assembled loan 
applications, and monitored mortgagors and the ir land after a loan was closed.  The companies hired office 
staff, meanwhile, to screen applications, to prepare and record loan documents, and to collect and disburse 
loan payments.
6  
The number and size of these mortgage companies grew rapidly during th e 1870s and 1880s.  The 
J.B. Watkins Company of Lawrence, Kansas, for example, was established in 1873 but within just seven 
years claimed an office staff of ten and dozens of loan agents in Kansas, Nebraska and Texas. By then the 
company sold its loans through offices in New York and London, and employed independent agents who 
operated in eleven other northeastern cities.
7   The left panel of Table 1 shows that between 1880 and 1886 
Watkins sold more than $1 million in loans each year and serviced about $5 million of outstanding loans.
8  In 
1887 Watkins added a debenture program to his operation that grew rapidly in size and importance  as 
Watkins placed nearly 40 percent of the loans he marketed behind debentures  in the first three years and 
nearly two-thirds of the loans after 1890 (see the right panel of Table 1). The introduction of a debenture 
program did not affect the methods that a mortgage company used to originate and service loans.  What 
changed, instead, was the risk-sharing arrangement between the company and investors, the method used to 
market mortgage loans, and the amount of information about the loans that the company shared with 
investors.
9   
 
                                                 
5 Eastern investors in the 1880s earned nominal returns of 6% to 7% on western mortgages when yields on high-grade 
railroad bonds ranged between 4.6% and 5.6% (Carter, Historical Statistics, series Cj1196).  Nominal interest rates and 
loan amounts are reported throughout this paper because the economy experienced gradual deflation of less than 1% per 
annum during the 1880s (Ibid, series Cc1-Cc2).  
6  Bogue Money at Interest, p. 85.  Bogue’s history of Watkins’s company is based on business and personal 
correspondence and the company’s business records; I rely heavily on this source throughout the paper.   
7  Ibid, pp. 86-90. 
8 The relationship between originations and servicing  in Table 1 reflects that nineteenth century farm mortgages were 
interest-only, balloon loans typically written for five -year terms and frequently renewed (see Mappin “Farm Mortgages”; 
Snowden “Mortgage Rates”).   
9 Two considerations important to modern mortgage securitization were not factors in the 1880s—the drive to make 
mortgages more liquid (secondary markets for debentures did not develop) and the need to spread prepayment risk 
(loans were short-term and frequently renewed).   5 
 
Which Companies Issued Debentures? Risk Bearing under Brokerage and Debentures 
Under brokerage the individual investor purchased a whole mortgage loan and owned all the benefits 
and risks associated with the borrower’s promised loan payments.  The mortgage company served as the 
investor’s agent in this transaction and was provided with incentives to select and service loans carefully by 
the same mechanisms that  are used in the modern loan sales market—loan participations and recourse 
agreements.
10 Participations were created by dividing each brokered loan into a first mortgage  that was 
assigned to the investor and a second lien, junior to the investor’s interest, that the company took as a 
commission.
11  Recourse provided the mortgage company with additional incentives as it committed to 
repurchase any loan that went into delinquency.
   If a borrower missed one payment, a company typically paid 
the investor from its own funds and sought collection; if the default became persistent, the company 
repurchased the loan from the investor and initiated foreclosure proceedings on its own behalf.
12 
  
A mortgage broker committed to repurchasing delinquent loans because it “could not allow client[s] 
to suffer the loss of a single dollar” without losing their confidence and business.
13  Maintaining this policy 
was costly and risky for mortgage companies, but they regularly honored their commitment even though they 
were not legally bound to do so.
14  Brokers, instead, offered recourse to investors as a moral or implicit 
promise that created a flexible risk -sharing arrangement between the two.
15  Most importantly, mortgage 
companies could legally suspend recourse in order to preserve financial capital and continue operations even 
when the borrowers they served came under general distress.  If the recourse commitments had been legally 
                                                 
10 Gorton and Pennachi  (“Banks and Loan  Sales,” p. 394) explain how loan participations and guarantees are used as 
incentive mechanisms when the seller of a loan provides costly credit services that are unobserved by the buyer. 
11 The borrower also paid an up-front commission that the broker shared with his loan agent.   
12  Bogue, Money at Interest, pp. 90-92. 
13 Robins, Farm Mortgage, pp. 82-4.  Robins spoke as the Vice President of the Farm Mortgage Bankers’ Association.  
14 Watkins, for example, hired a full-time attorney in 1883 simply to manage and sell 52,000 acres of farmland that the 
company had acquired through foreclosure on repurchased loans ( Bogue, Money at Interest, pp. 122-3). 
15 Some mortgage companies “guaranteed loans,” but committed only to collecting mortgage payments (Darrow, A 
Treatise, pp. 30-33); others avoided guarantees while emphasizing that they had protected investors by repurchasing 
failed loans; Bogue (Money at Interest, p. 126) describes Watkins’s decision to stop advertising guarantees.  For 
contemporary discussion on recourse see Preston, History of Banking, p.282; Robins, Farm Mortgage, pp. 86-9; Darrow, 
A Treatise, pp. 29-38.     6 
 
binding, then these thinly capitalized intermediaries would have failed in the same circumstance.
16 Investors 
agreed to a possible suspension of recourse  under brokerage, therefore, to avoid sharing the deadweight 
losses that would have been generated had the loan servicing operation  of their mortgage company been 
disrupted at the very time that loan renegotiation and monitoring would have been most valuable.
17  To 
accommodate this solution, mortgage companies built and maintained reputations for suspending recourse 
only to avoid a costly financial failure.
 18  
By issuing debentures a mortgage company strengthened and formalized its risk-bearing obligations.  
Debentures were debt contracts between the company and investors that were secured by pools of mortgages 
that the company owned and placed into trust.  The company employed a trustee to certify that the loans and 
supporting documents satisfied criteria stipulated in a trust agreement, but the trustee did not monitor the 
company’s loan origination or servicing operations, guarantee the performance of the loans, or underwrite the 
company’s debentures.
19  The trustee was required, however, to take possession and to dispose of the 
underlying mortgage pools on behalf of debenture holders if the company defaulted on its scheduled 
payments.
20  Under a debenture program, therefore, investors purchased the debt obligations of  a mortgage 
company that originated and serviced a specified pool of mortgage loans.   
The difference in the risk-sharing arrangements under debentures and brokerage helps to explain the 
timing and character of the farm mortgage debenture movement.  Prior to 1880 western mortgage companies 
                                                 
16 Boot et al “Reputation and Discretion”) show implicit promises are optimal to use when the deadweight losses 
associated with financial failure are greater than the reputational costs of reneging on commitments.   
17 Renegotiation with delinquent borrowers can mitigate the deadweight losses associated with forced transfers of 
land and real property (Fisher “Renegotiation”) and Baker et al (“Mortgage Redemption”).  Snowden (“The Evolution”) 
attributes the dominance of life insurance companies in interregional mortgage lending after 1890 to the advantages these 
large investors enjoyed in servicing mortgages if their mortgage company correspondents failed. 
18  Robins, (Farm Mortgage, pp. 99-100.  Watkins built his reputation during the early 1870s by mailing circulars, 
placing advertisements in eastern newspapers, corresponding tirelessly with potential investors and even paying for some 
of them to personally visit Lawrence to inspect his agency and the Kansas farm mortgage market (Bogue, Money at 
Interest, pp.79-84).  He also cultivated and expanded networks within the Quaker church (Ibid, p. 87).  
19  (New York, Annual Report, p. 21).  Trust agreements required first mortgage loans written for no more than one-
half the value of improved farmland.  The combined principals of the loans in a pool had to fully secure the 
debentures; between 100 and 200 mortgages were typically required to secure a $100,000 issue.    
20 Debenture holders held senior claims on a designated pool of loans and a general claim on the company’s 
unsecured assets. Trustees were required to take possession of the mortgage pool that secured a debenture sixty days 
after a default, but mortgage companies generally requested receivership in anticipation of default and were often 
appointed as their own receivers. See Chamberlain, “New-Fashioned”) for a description of receiverships during the 
1890s.   7 
 
were too small to originate well-diversified pools of mortgage loans and too poorly capitalized to protect 
against default, so they relied exclusively on brokerage and implicit recourse agreements, even though 
debentures were well-known to market participants.
21  Debentures became feasible in the 1880s after some 
farm mortgage brokers had established track records of success and grown in size.  Larger size per mitted 
companies to originate more spatially -diversified mortgage pools and to absorb the fixed administrative and 
legal expenses associated with a debenture operation.  A record of success, on the other hand, provided the 
company with access to lower-cost forms of internal and external financial capital to buffer shocks in the 
payment stream generated by the mortgage pools. Older, reputable companies were also better positioned, 
relative to young firms, to market brokered loans alongside, and in support of , their new debenture 
programs.
22 For all these reasons the debenture movement was likely to have been an outgrowth of existing, 
successful mortgage brokerage operations and not an innovation brought to the market by new mortgage 
companies.
23 To test this prediction, the pattern of debenture use for a sample of mortgage companies is 
examined in the next section.     
 
Which Loans were Funded? Marketing under Brokerage and Debentures 
Under debentures the investor, as well as the mortgage company, faced different costs and risks than 
under brokerage.  The investor’s expected net return on a brokered loan was influenced by its individual 
characteristics—its size and term and, given that the company might renege on recourse, its risk 
characteristics.
24  Because brokers had to make allowance for investors’ preferences over these loan 
characteristics, the marketing system they employed was cumbersome and costly. Brokers offered mortgages 
                                                 
21 Brewer (“Eastern Money”) attributes the failure of covered bonds that were issued by affiliates of eastern 
investment banks and life insurance companies in the 1870s to poor control over western loan origination 
networks—established mortgage companies possessed both financial strength and effective loan agent networks.   
22 A company operating both a brokerage and a debenture program could suspend recourse on brokered loans and divert 
financial resources to honor its fixed obligations on debentures.  Mortgage companies could have used this channel 
opportunistically, of course, and investors would have been reluctant to purchase a brokered loan from a new, poorly 
capitalized company that also issued debentures.   
23 The Watkins Company fits this explanation. The company issued debentures years after becoming a large and 
reputable farm mortgage broker and continued to broker loans even though Watkins had hoped to discontinue brokerage 
altogether (Bogue, Money at Interest, pp. 130-31). 
24 Loan size and term affected net rate of returns because of the substantial fixed costs investors bore when buying 
and holding a brokered loan.   8 
 
to investors on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by provisionally assigning loans to them and mailing the 
applications and supporting documents back east for their approval.
25  If a loan was rejected, it had to be 
reassigned to a second investor.  The number of reassignments that Watkins handled each year shown in the 
second column of Table 1 accounted for slightly less than 10  percent of the brokered loans sold. 
The assignment system of marketing brokered mortgage loans imposed substantial costs on both 
parties.  The investor had to expend time and effort, and sometimes employ legal counsel,  to assure that their 
assigned loan was well-secured. The exercise had to be repeated, moreover, if the first loan assigned by the 
company proved to be unacceptable.
26  The company spent its own time and effort placing a reassigned loan, 
of course, but also paid interest to investors on the funds they had invested until a loan was successfully 
assigned.
27  Brokers had good reason, therefore, to choose loans that investors were most likely to accept —
those that were typical in legal form, size, maturity and risk characteristics.
28 Borrowers with loans that fell 
outside these parameters would have paid a premium to offset higher expected marketing costs, and some 
loans would have been too irregular to broker at all.
29 There was room in 1880, accordingly,  for an innovation 
that could reduce the high and variable costs involved in marketing brokered loans.       
 Debenture bonds represented a solution because they offered investors an asset that was 
homogeneous in amount and term, regardless of the characteristics of the individual loans that secured 
them.
30 The investor’s risk on a debenture, moreover, depended on the income generated by the entire 
                                                 
25  Bogue, Money at Interest, pp. 90-92.  In the early 1870s Watkins mailed lists of pending applications east so that 
investors could select their loans; delay and expense occurred within this alternative system when two investors chose 
the same loan. 
26Darrow (A Treatise, pp. 1-5), in his guide for eastern investors, recommends an extensive inspection of loan 
documents, including a review of the papers by an attorney, before purchasing a brokered loan.  
27  Bogue, Money at Interest, pp. 123-4, 
28 Darrow, A Treatise, pp. 6-18.  Robins (Farm Mortgage, pp. 164-96) and published advertisements of western 
mortgage companies emphasized that brokered loans should only be written on occupied and improved quality farm land 
with debt-to-value ratios of no more than one-third, or occasionally one-half.   
29 Credit rationing would not have been the only inefficiency associate d with brokerage since borrowers might have been 
forced to alter the amount or term of their loan away from optimal levels in order to meet the standards required to 
qualify for mortgage credit.   
30 Debentures were generally written for five-year terms, and the loans that secured them could be replaced if they 
were paid off early or went into delinquency—in modern parlance the underlying mortgage pools were dynamic.  9 
 
mortgage pool that secured the bond and not on the characteristics of any single loan.
31 The marketing system 
used for debentures, as a result, was more efficient and less costly than under brokerage .  A single trustee, 
rather than hundreds of individual investors, evaluated loan applications and mortgage papers; reassignments 
were eliminated since the company could easily meet  the trust requirements that it had written; and each 
mortgage no longer had to be divided into a first and second note since the company received all of its cash 
flow.
32  These simplifications lowered marketing costs relative to brokerage for all mortgages , but the savings 
would have been greatest for loans that were difficult to broker because of unusual size, term or risk 
characteristics. To test this prediction,  I estimate below the decision rule that Watkins used in 1887 to allocate 
loans between his debenture and brokerage programs. 
 The marketing system under debentures was streamlined relative to brokerage, but created an 
additional asymmetry of information since investors no longer inspected the application and supporting 
documents for the loans they funded.
33  Debenture holders relied on three mechanisms to prevent mortgage 
companies from exploiting this informational advantage: the trust arrangement through which debentures 
were issued, supervision by state regulatory authorities, and the mortgage co mpany’s incentive to uphold 
underwriting standards in order to protect its own financial and reputational capital.  
It turns out that investors relied most heavily on the mortgage company’s “skin in the game” because 
regulation and trust arrangements provided weak supervisory oversight during the 1880s.  Regulation, to 
begin with, came too late as “foreign” western mortgage companies operating in Connecticut, New York and 
Massachusetts were not required to report even basic financial data to investors until 1889—years after the 
debenture movement began to expand rapidly.  Even when eastern state regulators published this information, 
moreover, they cautioned investors that the data were self-reported and that no funding existed for regular on-
                                                 
31 The loan pool offered investors overcollateralization in the event of default; the loans held in trust carried interest rates 
higher than the yield promised on the debentures because they had not been “split” into first and second notes.  Watkins 
used this feature of the securities when promoting his own debentures (Bogue, Money at Interest, p. 133). 
32  Darrow, A Treatise, pp. 20-21. 
33 Darrow (A Treatise, p. 23) advised investors to inspect all of the loans placed in trust behind debentures.  But Watkins 
(Bogue, Money at Interest, pp. 130-31) turned out to be correct in predicting that they would not.  10 
 
sight examinations of the loan underwriting operations of companies located hundreds of miles away.
34  I 
have noted earlier, as well, that the trustees who administered debenture programs for the mortgage 
companies were also not required to directly monitor their  western lending operations.  The first substantial 
external examination of western mortgage companies did not occur, in fact, until eastern regulators were 
required to audit the companies that entered receivership in the early and mid-1890s.  These inquiries 
revealed numerous examples of lax underwriting standards and violations of trust agreements that were 
particularly egregious when failing companies used all available measures to postpone  default.
35  This 
evidence underscores the critical role that the issuer’s own “skin in the game” played in controlling the 
informational asymmetry that was associated with debentures and that is inherent in any covered mortgage 
bond program.  The behavior of failing companies tells us much less, of course, about the decisions mortgage 
companies made regarding the quality of debenture loans when they were solvent and still had incentives to 
maintain strict underwriting standards.  I use the Watkins loan sample in the last section of the paper to 
examine this important issue.   
   
Which Companies Issued Debentures? 
Table 2 summarizes information that was reported in 1890 to the New York and Massachusetts 
regulators who supervised the western “foreign” mortgage companies that operated in the two states.
36 The 
companies are grouped in the table by the years in which they were organized so that each row reports the 
group total or average for companies of a particular age.
37 The data highlight both the success and limits of 
the debenture movement.  On the one hand, debentures were a widely  deployed innovation that had a 
substantial impact on the western farm mortgage market —sixty-two of ninety-nine mortgage companies that 
                                                 
34  Massachusetts, Annual Report (1890), pp. 5-7; New York, Annual Report (1891), pp. 15-27. 
35For accounts of similar abuses by other mortgage companies see New York  (Annual Report (1891), pp. 16-9).  
Snowden (“Mortgage Securitization”, pp. 279-81) summarizes regulators’ findings and criticisms of both operating and 
failed farm mortgage debenture companies.  
36 The data were drawn from New York and Massachusetts state reports; a few companies might not have operated in 
these two most important states. The reports also did not include companies that conducted business through the mail.  
37 The Watkins Company is shown on the first line and in the totals on the second line of the table. Watkins issued 
debentures later than other older companies, but soon  marketed a higher share of loans behind them.   11 
 
were licensed in these two states had established debenture programs by 1890. These programs, moreover, 
together funded one-tenth of the outstanding western farm mortgage debt.
38  On the other hand, brokerage 
continued to dominate the western farm mortgage market in 1890.  All mortgage companies that issued 
debentures continued to broker loans, one-third of licensed mortgage companies had still not established 
covered bond programs, and debentures were used to fund only 19 percent of the total mortgage debt 
marketed by the licensed companies. A key challenge in understanding the debenture movement of the 
1880s, therefore, is to explain why only some mortgage companies adopted the innovation and why 
brokerage continued to be so widely used after debentures had appeared.   
The discussion in the last section offers a plausible explanation—the western farm mortgage industry 
had limited capacity to support the introduction of covered bonds because only large, established and 
financially secure companies could credibly issue their own debt.  The descriptive mortgage company data in 
Table 2 support some elements of this explanation, but contradict others.  It was true, for example, that 
established firms dominated the debenture market as more than 80 percent ($40 million) of the new securities 
that were outstanding in 1890 were issued by the oldest 37 companies in the industry.  Taken together these 
older firms were also responsible for 75 percent ($180 million) of all the farm mortgage debt handled by 
licensed companies, so they were also relatively large in size.  The grouped data do not appear, however, to 
support the prediction that the most financially secure mortgage companies issued debentures because they 
had access to low-cost sources of financial capital.  The older firms that issued most of the debentures, in fact, 
held lower amounts of capital per dollar of outstanding loans than did younger firms that relied almost 
exclusively on brokerage.   
To sort out the pattern of debentures use across the  mortgage companies I use the individual firm 
data underlying Table 2 to examine two decisions that each mortgage company faced in the 1880s—whether 
to establish a debenture program and, if so, how large it would grow relative to the company’s brokerage 
business. The analysis relies on a two-part model of debenture usage: a probit model for the decision to 
                                                 
38 The $48.7 million of debentures shown in Table 2 is compared here to estimates to the overall size of the western farm 
mortgage market in 1890 as estimated in Snowden (“Evolution”, Table 1).  
 12 
 
establish a debenture program and a truncated regression model to explain the shares of loans marketed with 
the security for the subset of companies that decided to issue debentures. Both models use the same 
specification:   
Debenture Usagei =   β 0  + β 1 ∙ Size i +  β 2 ∙ Capital i /Loansi         (1) 
          + β3 ∙ Real Estatei /Assetsi  + β4 ∙ % Loans Paid i +  β5 ∙ Age i   
          + β 6 ∙ South-West  + β7 ∙ Plains + β8 ∙ Northeast +   u i ,  
where debenture usage is measured with an indicator variable equal to one for the 62 firms that established 
debenture programs in the probit model, and is set equal to the share of outstanding loans marketed behind 
debentures in the truncated regression.
39   
The explanatory variables in the specification capture variations in the size, financial stre ngth and 
reputation of each company, factors that were conjectured earlier to be the important determinants of the 
capacity to establish a debenture program.  Size is measured here as the natural logarithm of the total volume 
of loans outstanding in 1890; by this metric firms that were established before 1885 were on average five 
times larger than younger firms (see Table 2).
40  The financial strength of each company is captured in two 
ways—by the ratio of paid-in capital to outstanding loans and by the percent of each company’s assets that 
were held in real estate. The latter is included because the most important risk facing western mortgage 
companies was the losses they could suffer when acquiring and disposing of foreclosed land.  We also 
measure the firm’s reputation in two ways—by the natural logarithm of its age and by the percentage of loans 
marketed by the company that had been successfully paid off by 1890 (see columns 5 and 6 of Table 2).  Age 
should pick up the impacts of longevity, including reputation, that are unrelated to firm size and financial 
strength, while age and the share of loans paid off are interpreted here as proxies for reputation in brokerage 
since no firms had issued debentures before 1883.  Both reputational variables are expected to be positively 
related to debenture use.  
                                                 
39  The data rejected the alternative Tobit model of debenture usage.  See the discussion below. 
40 Total loans outstanding, rather than company assets, is used as a measure of the size of the firm’s lending operations 
because brokered loans were off the company’s balance sheet. 13 
 
Also included in the debenture usage models are dummy variables that indicate the regional location 
of each company’s home office—52 were headquartered in the Great Plains (the Dakotas, Nebraska and 
Kansas), 26 in the omitted Midwest region (Minnesota, Iowa and Missouri), eleven in the south and far west, 
and ten that operated western lending operations from home offices in the Northeast.
41  These regional fixed 
effects are included to control for differences in t he characteristics of loans that the companies marketed, in 
the mortgage laws that governed foreclosure  in their lending areas, and in the regulatory regimes under which 
they operated.
42  
The estimates reported in Table 3 reveal why a two -part model, rather than a single Tobit regression, 
is the preferred specification of debenture usage —measures of company size, financial strength and 
reputation had different impacts on the decision to establish a debenture program than they did on the choice 
of how intensively to use it.
43  The important correlates of the participation decision, as shown in the left 
panel of Table 3, were firm size and financial strength as measured by the amount of paid -in capital per dollar 
of loans marketed. The impact of size was large a s well as statistically significant: a one unit increase from 
the mean (that is, from $.89 to $3.3 million of loans) increased the probability of establishing a debenture 
program by 38 percent.  The significant positive association between debenture use an d financial capital in 
the probit regression, moreover, stands in contrast to the misleading as well as counterintuitive pattern in the 
group averages shown in Table 2—firms that issued debentures held more, not less, financial capital per 
dollar of outstanding loans after controlling for firm size.  Both results suggest that the debenture movement 
grew out of established brokerage businesses because these firms could reduce the probability of defaulting 
                                                 
41 Regional rather than state dummies are included in the specification because five states in the “South and West” 
and “Eastern” groups had only one operating mortgage company (California, Georgia Massachusetts, Vermont and 
Washington) while all of the companies operating in Connecticut and Texas issued debentures.  Because of these data 
limitations, regional effects for these two regional groupings are not interpreted here. The results reported below, 
however, also hold for models with individual state dummies fitted for the “Great Plains” and “Midwestern” groups.       
42 We have seen earlier that mortgages of unusual size, term and risk would have gained most from being funded with 
debentures. The state regulatory reports provided no information ab out the average characteristics of the loans marketed 
by each company, and the regional dummies can  also be interpreted as controls for this variation.  
43 The Tobit model assumes each variable has the same affect on the latent variable —the share of loans securitized—
above and below zero while the two-part model permits variables to have different impacts on the decision to establish a 
debenture program and the share of loans to fund with it.  The Tobit model was rejected at the p=.01 level using the 
likelihood ratio test from Greene (Econometric Analysis, p. 770); the truncated regression corrects the standard errors of 
the coefficient estimates for the excluded observations. 14 
 
by assembling spatially diversified loan pools and backing the promised payments from them with greater 
amounts of financial capital.
44 
The estimates of the truncated regression shown in the right panel of Table 3 indicate that a different 
set of factors explains how intensively companies used their new deben ture programs. As expected, higher 
levels of capital were associated with  a greater reliance on debentures after the innovation was adopted, but 
company size had no statistically significant impact on the share of loans marketed behind the new securities. 
The intensity of debenture use also increased with company age and decreased with the share of assets held in 
real estate, although neither measure had a statistically significant impact on  the probability of issuing the 
securities in the first place.  These last two impacts suggest that reputation and past performance  were 
important determinants of the willingness of investors to accept  a particular debenture issue once a program 
had been established.  Older mortgage companies had by the late 1880s maintained successful loan brokerage 
operations for a decade or more, while companies  that held low amounts of foreclosed real estate on their 
balance sheet had shown that they could select mortgages carefully and service them responsibly.   
The mortgage company data indicate, therefore, that debenture programs  tended to be established by 
large and financially secure mortgage companies and that the securities were then used most intensively by 
companies that had strong records of past performance.  The debenture mo vement of the 1880s grew 
alongside, and out of, the brokerage loan system that dominated the western farm mortgage market.  
 
  
What Types of Loans were Funded with Debentures?  
After establishing its debenture program in 1887, the Watkins Company had to decide—like other 
mortgage companies that adopted the innovation—which mortgages to place behind covered bonds and 
which ones to broker.  In this section I examine that decision for a sample of 689 loans that Watkins made 
                                                 
44 The coefficients on the regional dummies also suggest, not surprisingly, that debentures were adopted 
disproportionately by mortgage companies headquartered in the Great Plains.  15 
 
and marketed in the first year of his debenture program.
45 These mortgages were typical of loans that 
Watkins had brokered since opening his company in 1873 as they were all written on Kansas farmland 
and negotiated through the company’s established loan agent system. The data for each loan, moreover, 
was drawn from the company’s original mortgage ledger so that we observe the same information for these 
loans that the company’s personnel recorded as 465 of these loans were being brokered and the remaining 
224 were assigned to the company’s debenture program.
46 I use the loan sample in this section to assess 
how and why this allocation was made.    
The descriptive statistics for the brokered and debenture loans are shown separately in Table 4.  
Both groups were written on farms that averaged just less than 150 acres in size, but debenture loans were 
smaller in size (an average of $536 versus $628) and so carried lower average debt-per-acre ($3.76 to 
$4.51).  Debenture loans were also written more often for short, three-year terms, for unusually small 
amounts (less than $400), and on farms that were located in western Kansas, in recently settled counties 
of the state, or far away from Watkins’s Lawrence office.
47  Watkins expanded his new program quickly 
in 1887 so that the proportion of loans that were brokered fell from three-quarters to one-third between 
the first and fourth quarters of the year.   
The bottom panel in Table 4 shows the average effective interest rates borrowers were charged 
and the average gross rates of return to be paid under the contracts to Watkins, his loan agents and 
investors for both brokered and debenture loans.
48 These data reveal two interesting patterns. First, 
Watkins’s average contractual rate of return on debenture loans was 98 basis points higher than on 
                                                 
45 Watkins planned to issue $10.2 million debentures between 1887 and 1893 and actually issued most of them before 
the company entered receivership in April, 1894 (see Table 1).  
46 Excluded from this sample were loans that Watkins made in Texas and Louisiana, loans made outside Watkins’s 
normal lending network, and nearly 100 mortgages on farms in western Missouri and eastern Kansas; 90 percent of 
Watkins’s mortgages were located in the western two-thirds of the state in 1890. 
47 The miles-from-Watkins variable is the distance between Lawrence and the center of each borrower’s township-
range section. The West Kansas region includes counties within 80 miles of the state’s western boundary. Specification 
tests indicated that additional regional dummies were not required.  
48 The effective interest rate is the sum of average annual interest and commission payments divided by the 
discounted loan amount—a measure close to the true yield to maturity for these non-amortized loans. The gross rates 
of return under the contract were computed from the commission payments, interest charges and loan amounts as 
they were recorded in Watkins’s ledgers. The gross returns for the investor, Watkins and the loan agent do not add up 
to the effective interest rate because they were calculated relative to undiscounted loan amounts.  The investor’s gross 
contractual return on a debenture loan was the coupon rate on the debentures that it secured.   16 
 
brokered loans.  The reverse was true for investors as their average gross rate of return on brokered loans 
was 58 basis points higher than the return on debentures.  Second, the average mortgage rate on loans 
placed behind debentures was 68 basis points higher than the average rate on brokered loans.  This 
differential indicates systematic differences in lending costs and risks across the two programs and 
accounting for these turns out to be an essential first step in understanding and interpreting Watkins’s 
debenture selection rule.   
 
Mortgage Rates and Foreclosure within the Loan Sample        
The effective interest rate that Watkins charged his borrowers can be modeled as a hedonic 
function of loan terms, borrower location and local mortgage market conditions
49: 
 
The first group of regressors controls for the impacts that loan size, term-to-maturity and debt-per-acre 
had on the borrower’s costs of funds.  Because mortgage origination and marketing entailed fixed costs, 
the effective rate should have decreased with loan size and contract length; rates should have also 
increased with the borrower’s leverage as measured here by the debt-per-acre. Three location regressors 
are also included in the specification to capture variations across space in agricultural risk, in lending risk, 
and in monitoring costs during this decade of rapid agricultural settlement in Kansas: the distance 
between the borrower and Watkins’s Lawrence office and indicators for loans that were made in Western 
Kansas or in a newly settled county.
50  The remaining six variables control for temporal, local or firm-
level influences on mortgage rates—quarterly dummies to control for seasonal impacts, Watkins’s share 
                                                 
49 Specification tests revealed no statistically significant interactions among loan terms (size, maturity and debt per 
acre), among location variables and debt per acre, and between debenture status and all loan terms and location 
variables.  See Snowden (“Mortgage Rates”) for a similar hedonic specification explaining county-level mortgage 
rates drawn from 1890 census data.   
50 Counties are identified as “Newly Settled” if no mortgage lending activity occurred there in 1880 as reported in 
the U.S. Census, Report on Real Estate Mortgages. 17 
 
of lending and previous foreclosure experience in each county, and an indicator for the participation of 
one of Watkins’s high-volume loan agents.
51  Finally, debenture status is included to capture the 
remaining unexplained difference in average rates on debenture and brokered loans.  
The estimated hedonic model, reported in the first two columns of Table 5, explains nearly three-
fourths of the variation in the borrower’s cost of funds—and the entire 68 basis point differential between 
average mortgage rates on brokered and debenture loans.  The latter result makes sense because 
borrowers in a competitive primary farm mortgage market would have refused to pay a premium based 
simply on how their loans were to be funded. The hedonic specification is also recommended by the 
reasonable signs and magnitudes of other estimated coefficients, such as the 20 basis point reduction in 
the rate for a large-sized loan and a 39 basis point increase in rates for a short-term loan.
52 The locational 
measures of production and lending risk, moreover, trace out a sensible spatial pattern of lending risk 
premia that ranges from 200 basis points in the more settled areas of central Kansas to nearly 400 basis 
points in the most western areas of the state; borrowers also paid a 48 basis point premium if they were 
located in a newly settled county. Rates were significantly lower in markets in which Watkins’s own 
lending was heaviest, but were unaffected by the other company-related measures of local market 
conditions.
53  The coefficients on the quarterly dummies, finally, indicate that rates charged to borrowers 
fell by 60 basis points over the course of the year.  
An unexpected result in Table 5 is that the debt-per-acre on loans had a small and statistically 
insignificant impact on mortgage rates.  This variable was included because the actual loan-to-value ratio, 
                                                 
51 Watkins’s market share is his lending volume in each county between 1883 and 1886 divided by county-wide total 
mortgage lending as reported in the U.S. Census, Report on Real Estate Mortgages.  His share was no larger than 5 
percent for any county, so the variable should not be interpreted as a measure of market power.  A "Big Agent" 
dummy was assigned to the eight loan agents with the highest volume between 1883 and 1886. The foreclosure dummy 
indicates if any loan held by Watkins within the same county had been "deeded" or was "in suit" in 1886. 
52 To recoup $20 in fixed costs on a $600, five-year loan a borrower would have to be charged 66 basis points per 
year, 50 basis points for a five-year $800 dollar loan, and 110 basis points for a three-year $600 loan—all are very 
close in magnitude to the estimated coefficients in the model.  The effect of short maturities might also reflect a 
reinvestment risk premium since the general level of western mortgage rates declined gently throughout the 1880s.  
53 The predicted rate was 73 basis points lower in the county in which Watkins lent the greatest volume ($203,000) 
indicating either company-specific economies of scale or strong competition from other companies in these counties. 18 
 
which is the traditional measure of mortgage lending risk, was not available for the sample.
54 Debt-per-
acre could be a poor proxy for actual leverage, of course, if the remainder of the specification does not 
adequately control for variation in land values across the sample.  It is also likely, moreover, that lenders 
adjusted the term and size of a mortgage, as well as absolute debt levels, to control lending risk. 
As a check on the specification of ex ante lending risk in the mortgage rate equation, the last three 
columns of Table 5 examine how well the same set of regressors predict the likelihood of foreclosure for the 
loans in the sample.
55  The probit model reported there (the dependent variable equals one if Watkins 
subsequently foreclosed on the loan) employs the same hedonic specification used in the mortgage rate 
model but this time augmented with two county-level measures of mortgage market disruption for the three-
year period after the loans were made—the percentage change between 1887 and 1889 in the number of acres 
mortgaged and in the debt-per-acre on new mortgage loans.  Both should have decreased if general mortgage 
distress spread within a county.
56  
The estimates of the probit model show that two of the locational measures of risk from the mortgage 
rate regression affected the probability of foreclosure several years later in the expected direction —the 
probability increased with distance from Watkins’s office and was higher for loans made within a newly 
settled county. The results also reveal, as expected, that foreclosure was more likely for loans that were 
located in counties where the debt-per-acre on new loans decreased between 1887 and 1889.  On the other 
hand, the probability of foreclosure was lower, just like mortgage rates, in counties where Watkins lent large 
volumes of funds.  These results provide confidence that the hedonic mortgage rate specification captures 
fundamental lending risk as it was priced and ultimately felt in the primary mortgage market.
57   
Against this backdrop the behavior of the  debt-per-acre variable in the foreclosure equation is 
striking—it was strongly, positively and statistically significantly associated with the probability of 
                                                 
54 The amount of land, and not its appraised value, was recorded in the company’s ledgers. 
55 The foreclosure status for each loan was reported in ledgers called "Mortgages Maturing" as well as records of 
foreclosed lands.  Loans that were "deeded" o r "in suit" were classified as foreclosed.  
56 The number and amount of farm mortgage debt made on farms in 1887, 1888 and 1889 were drawn from the U.S. 
Census, Report on Real Estate Mortgages. 
57 The negative impact of small loan size on foreclosure, and the similarly-sized, weaker impact of a short loan term, 
could reflect that such loans tended to be paid off before the impact of the mortgage crisis was felt in the early 1890s.   19 
 
foreclosure even though it had no impact on the effective mortgage rate when these loans were actually being 
written.  This pattern suggests that debt-per-acre was an effective measure of lending risk, at least after 
origination, and provides evidence that Watkins may have accepted some loans that violated his own 
conservative standard of holding loan-to-value ratios below fifty percent.
 58  Bogue reports convincing 
evidence, in fact, that the Watkins Company was under competitive pressure from other lenders to approve 
poorly secured loans in 1887.
59  The evidence of market-wide pressures on underwriting standards during the 
late 1880s makes it particularly interesting to assess how Watkins, and presumably other mortgage 
companies, assigned loans to their debenture programs.    
 
 
Selecting Loans for Debentures 
An important feature of the Watkins’s sample is that it contains the information investors in the 
brokered loan market would have observed about each mortgage whether it was brokered or placed 
behind the company’s debentures.
60  To take advantage of this feature of the data, two probit models of 
debenture status are reported in Table 6.  The model in the left panel of the table uses the entire hedonic 
specification from the effective interest rate to explain debenture status while the second includes only 
those variables within the hedonic specification that an investor would have observed had the loan been 
                                                 
58 Demyanyk and Van Hemert (“Understanding”) have shown similar behavior by mortgage loan originators 
between 2005 and 2007 who became aware of a gradual decrease in the quality of residential mortgage loans that 
they made. Mappin (“Farm Mortgages,” p.  440) provides evidence that similar lending pressures appeared in 1887 
with the arrival of a “flood” of eastern orders for western farm mortgages.   
59 The supervisor of Watkins’s loan agents wrote in 1887 that: “The great trouble is the competition …in the amounts 
other companies are willing to loan... [t]here is certainly a line beyond which…land will not be sufficient security, and 
we think a great many of the loaning companies … are lending more money than the farms are sufficient security for" 
(Bogue, Money at Interest, p. 142).  Bogue (Ibid, pp. 141-4) then  recounts the difficulty Watkins had in approving 
enough loans to satisfy his loan agents; so much so that a company official wrote in 1888 that “[o]ne year ago sub agents 
and borrowers run [sic] the loaning business in this state about to suit themselves” (Ibid, p. 144). 
60A plausible alternative for debenture selection that was not supported by the evidence is that Watkins chose loans 
behind debentures in response to differences in the  gross rates of return that investors required for each loan in the two 
markets.  This alternative was examined for the loan sample by modeling t he investors’ gross returns as functions of 
the hedonic specification separately for both debenture and brokered loans. Loan characteristics or measures of risk 
did not influence investors’ returns in either case and so would not have affected Watkins’s selection decision. 
These results make sense in light of the marketing systems described earlier—brokered loans were offered to 
investors on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, while investors could not observe the characteristics of loans placed behind 
debentures.  20 
 
brokered. We refer to this smaller subset of variables as the “Mortgage Papers Information” set, and the 
estimates in Table 6 indicate that only these loan features were associated with debenture selection.
61  
The importance of the mortgage papers information set in debenture selection, coupled with the 
interpretation of the individual coefficient estimates in the probit model, represents strong evidence that 
Watkins used his covered mortgage bond program to fund loans that would have been difficult and costly 
to broker. Investors would have avoided buying small and short-term loans, for example, unless they 
received a higher rate of return to compensate for the substantial fixed costs they bore under brokerage.  
Watkins tended to place these loans behind his debentures.  Large-sized loans should have been preferred 
in the brokered market for the same reason and, as expected, had low probabilities of being funded with 
covered bonds.  Investors would have been particularly cautious purchasing brokered loans with high 
idiosyncratic lending risk such as those made in Western Kansas or far away from Watkins’s Lawrence 
office—but Watkins placed these types of loans behind the company’s new securities. These patterns of 
debenture assignment are all consistent with the hedonic mortgage rate regression in that the same loan 
characteristics that raised lending costs and risks in the primary mortgage market also increased the 
probability of a loan being placed behind debentures.  Together these results provide compelling evidence 
that debentures were used to provided a funding channel to serve borrowers who were most poorly served 
by the brokered loan system.   
The debt-per-acre variable follows a different pattern as Watkins avoided brokering loans with 
relatively high levels of debt per acre even though this proxy for the true debt-to-value ratio had no 
impact on expected lending costs and risks as captured in the hedonic mortgage rate model..  On the other 
hand, we have seen earlier that loans with high levels of debt per acre had higher probabilities of 
foreclosure and that Watkins felt competitive pressure to approve loans with high loan-to-value ratios in 
1887.  Taken together the pattern of evidence  suggests that Watkins used his new debenture program not 
only to fund
  loans that had always been risky and costly to broker, but also to fund mortgages that were 
made under relaxed mortgage lending standards during the western farm mortgage lending boom of the 
                                                 
61 The likelihood ratio test (χ
2(4)=2.94) cannot reject the null of equivalence between the two nested probit models.  21 
 
late 1880s.  If so, this evidence provides an important cautionary note to claims that an issuer’s “skin in 
the game” under the covered mortgage bond contract provides strong incentives to maintain lending 
standards because the Watkins Company
 was a solvent, well-established and reputable mortgage company 
in 1887.  
Watkins could use debentures to market relatively high-cost and high-risk mortgages because, as 
explained earlier, covered bonds packaged the costs and risks on mortgage loans differently than 
brokerage.  To demonstrate this feature of the innovation, Table 7 reports the sources of the differentials 
in the average effective mortgage rates for debenture and brokered mortgages in the sample and in the 
differences in the average gross rates of return that each market participant was to be paid under the 
contracts for the two groups of loans.  In the first column of Table 7 the differential in average effective 
mortgage rates has been decomposed into four components by using the in-sample predictions from the 
earlier hedonic mortgage rate regression.  That calculation reveals that higher lending costs and risks on 
debenture loans (as measured by loan terms, size, maturity and location) explain 76 basis points of the 
differential in average mortgage rates between brokered and debenture loans while differences in market 
conditions (that measure the strength of local demand and supply) reduced the differential by an average 
of 9 basis points. After controlling for these influences, debenture status itself explains none of the 
average differential in mortgage rates between the two types of loans. 
To sort out how the debenture contract allocated these differences in lending costs and risks 
among the parties, the same hedonic specification was used to model the gross contractual return earned 
by Watkins, his loan agents and investors. These three regressions are reported in Appendix Table 1 and, 
as above, the in-sample predictions from them were used to decompose the differential between loan 
types in average gross returns for each group.
62  Three patterns stand out.  First, the debenture contract 
                                                 
62 The average gross rates of return under contract for Watkins, his agent and the investor for debenture and 
brokered loans are reported in the bottom panel of Table 4—the exercise reported in Table 7 simply decomposes the 
differentials between the two. Recall (see note 48) that the effective mortgage rate does not equal the sum of the 
three gross rates of return because the former is calculated using the loan amount net of commissions. The mortgage 
rate and three gross return equations are, nonetheless, a seemingly unrelated system.  Each equation has been 22 
 
directed all of the payments borrowers agreed to as compensation for higher lending costs and risks to 
Watkins and his loan agents.
 63  This pattern made sense because investors bore none of these loan-
specific costs or risks while holding debentures that were secured by these mortgages.  Second, all three 
groups shared the relatively small decreases in gross returns on debenture loans, relative to brokered 
loans, that were associated with differences in the local market conditions under which they were 
negotiated.  Finally, Watkins’s gross return increased by 54 basis points, and investors’ fell by a nearly 
identical amount, when a mortgage loan—regardless of its lending risk, costs or market characteristics—
was placed behind a debenture.  This shift in returns compensated mortgage companies for the costs 
associated with establishing trusts, issuing securities, and holding additional financial capital when they 
issued debentures.  Investors in covered bonds, on the other hand, received lower gross returns than on 
brokered loans because they no longer had to evaluate, purchase and hold an individual mortgage or bear 
the risk on it.     
 
Conclusion 
The debenture movement of the 1880s involved the introduction of covered mortgage bonds as an 
alternative to a loan brokerage system that up until then had dominated the interregional farm mortgage 
market in the United States. Western mortgage companies adopted the innovation in order to provide 
investors with greater risk sharing and lower transactions costs than were available under brokerage, but by 
holding loans and issuing bonds against this security these firms increased the probability of their own 
financial failure. These basic insights have been used here to explain both the timing and the contribution of 
the debenture movement.  First, mortgage companies did not issue debentures until the 1880s because before 
then they were not large enough or sufficiently well-capitalized to issue their own securities.  Second, 
debentures improved the efficiency of the interregional mortgage market, and broadened access to it, by 
                                                                                                                                                             
estimated separately here because GLS procedures are no more efficient when identical sets of regressors are used 
(Greene, Econometric Analysis, p. 343).  
63 To provide incentives to find good borrowers, mortgage companies paid agents fixed commission only after a loan 
application was approved. Agents were then expected to service and enforce outstanding loans with no additional 
compensation, so they shared in the lending risk and had to be compensated for it (Snowden, “Evolution,” pp. 221-5).  23 
 
creating a funding mechanism for loans that were difficult and costly to broker because of unusual size, 
term to maturity or risk characteristics.  Lance Davis conjectured more than four decades ago that 
mortgage companies were instrumental to the regional integration of the farm mortgage market.
64  The 
analysis presented here clarifies both the timing and character of their contribution.   
The broader access provided by debentures helped to  finance a rapid expansion of mortgage debt in 
western agricultural markets during the 1880s .  During that expansion we have seen that Watkins, and 
presumably other mortgage companies, profited by placing riskier loans behind debentures than the ones he 
brokered.  This feature of the debenture movement proved to be a double -edged sword when weather shocks 
and financial panic in the early 1890s wreaked havoc in the western farm mortgage market.  The crisis drove 
the Watkins agency into receivership along with 89 of the 98 other mortgage companies that had been 
licensed to operate in New York and Massachusetts  in 1890 (see the third column of Table 2).   It is difficult 
to argue, therefore, that the use of covered mortgage bonds strengthen ed mortgage companies or provided 
them with strong incentives to resist a general weakening of mortgage lending standards  during the 1880s. 
The debenture movement, therefore, represents a cautionary tale as we once again consider introducing 
covered bonds to the U.S. mortgage market.  
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J.B. Watkins Mortgage Brokerage and Debenture Operations  
  Watkins' Brokerage Business    Watkins' Securitization Business 
                 
     
Total    Debentures 
Loans Placed In 
Trust: 
 
Number of Loans:  Amount    Number  Face  Number  Total  




      ($000s)       ($000s)     ($000s) 
                 
 
       
        1880  1,126    (220)     635.6     --  --  --  -- 
1881  1,675    (323)     1,018.1    
--  --  --  -- 
1882  859    ( 76)     607.8    
--  --  --  -- 
1883  968    ( 65)     894.8    
--  --  --  -- 
1884  1,278    ( 58)     1,105.2    
--  --  --  -- 
1885  1,669    ( 79)     1,433.8      
--  20    15   
1886  1,970    (140)     1,685.3    
--  --  231    182   
1887  1,039    (101)     963.6      
800    602    515   
1888  540    ( 41)     557.5     10    1,000    381    605   
1889  539    ( 45)     865.5     10    1,000    343    611   
  All Loans 1880-1889 
 
All Loans 1880-1889 
  11,663     (1148)     9,767      20     2,800     1,577    1,927   
                 
1890  329     ( 17)     447.4     10     1000     326    739   
1891  125     ( 17)     107.5         522    761   
1892  91     ( 17)     100.0     64  {6400}  375    409   
1893  208     ( 13)     299.0         108    165   
 
All Loans 1890-1893    All Loans 1890-1893 
   753     ( 64)     954       10     7,400     1,331    2,074   
                  Notes:  Mortgages placed in trust could be reassigned to different series and were valued at the original face 
value of the loan.  The number of debenture series and loans that Watkins planned to issue between 1891and 
1893 is shown in the right panel. The company records are unclear concerning how many of these were 
actually issued prior to the company’s receivership.   
Sources:  The number and amount of mortgages sold by the Watkins Company were drawn directly from the 




Western Mortgage Loan Companies Operating in Massachusetts and New York in 1890  
Age of Companies  Number of Companies  Cumulative Loan 
Volume  Totals in 1890 ($ millions)  Percent of Loans  
  Licensed  Issuing  Licensed  ($ millions)   Per  Assets  Out-  Deb-  Paid-
In   
(Year Established)  In  Deben-  In   Made  Paid    Cent    standing   entures  Capital  Deb-   Paid-
In 
   1890  tures  1896-97     Off  Paid     Loans  Issued     entures  Capital 
                         
J.B. Watkins Company 
18 Years  (1872)  Y       Y       N      15.9    8.3    52%    5.7    7.6  3.0  0.8  39%  10% 
All Companies (Including Watkins) 
                         
11-20 yrs. (1872-79)  14       11       4      107.1    52.6    49%    27.5    54.5  16.4  5.6  30%  10% 
6-10 yrs. (1880-84)  23       19       3      186.2    49.6    27%    47.7    136.6  24.2  10.8  18%  8% 
5 yrs. (1885)  15       9       1       34.1    8.0    23%    11.5    26.1     5.5  3.6  21%  14% 
4 yrs. (1886)    12       9         24.0    9.1    38%    5.2    14.9     1.7  2.5  11%  16% 
3 yrs. (1887)  11       5       1       10.0    1.6    16%    3.2    8.4      0.4  1.5  5%  18% 
2 yrs. (1888)  11       4         5.5      6%    2.5    5.1  0.2  1.3  4%  25% 
1 yr. (1889)  13       5         5.3    0.4    8%    2.5    4.9  0.4  1.4  8%  29% 
                         
Total  99       62       9      372.2    121.7    33%    100   250.5  48.7  26.7  19%  11% 
                                      
  Source: Massachusetts:  Annual Report of the Commissioner of Foreign Mortgage Corporations, First (1890) and Second (1891). 
New York:  Annual Report of Superintendent of Banking, Relative to Foreign Mortgage, Loan and Investment Companies, 1891. 28 
 
TABLE 3   
Determinants of Issuing Debentures and Share of Loans Behind Debentures in 1890 
99 Western Mortgage Loan Companies Operating in Massachusetts and New York  
  Probit:  Debentures = 1    Truncated Regression:Debenture Share  
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effects
     Coefficient  Marginal Effects
  
  (s.e.)  ∂F(x,u)/∂xi  (s.e.)     (s.e.)  ∂Share(x)/∂xi  (s.e.)  




1.51  (1.93)    
  (0.23)            
(6.22)          
Paid-In Capital/Loans Out.   0.02  *  0.007**   (0.002)       0.48  **  0.14**  (0.06)    
  (0.01)            
(0.19)          
Real Estate / Assets  -0.03    -0.010  (0.007)       -3.20    -0.96**  (0.41)    
  (0.02)            
(1.71)          
Paid-Off Loans/All Loans Made
   -0.01    -0.003  (0.004)       0.62    0.19  (0.10)    
  (0.01)            
(0.38)          
Age of Company (ln)  0.06    0.021  (0.101)       30.94  **  9.32**  (3.37)    
  (0.26)            
(7.23)          
Located in South or West  0.56    0.222  (0.227)       34.77  **  10.47**  (2.68)    
  (0.59)            
(12.48)          
Located in Great Plains  1.14  **  0.420**   (0.137)       -19.15    -5.77  (4.94)    
  (0.39)            
(13.88)          
Located in Northeast  1.39  **  0.481**   (0.159)       42.92  **  12.92**  (3.31)    
  (0.57)            
(12.84)          
Constant  -15.02  **        -141.02       
  (3.19)            
(91.93)          
Sigma Constant            26.30       
           
(3.97)           Observations  99          62     
  (Pseudo-R2)  0.36   
      0.41   
 
  Log Likelihood /   -41.79  **        -234.05  **   
  Chi
2(8) / (F(8,53)  28.95  **           45.54  **       
** denotes significance at 1 percent.  
*   denotes significance at 5 percent  
Notes: The table reports robust standard errors. Marginal effects for continuous variables are measured at their means with regional variables set to 
zero (Midwest omitted region). Marginal effects for regional variables measured for a change from 0 to 1 measured at the means of the 
continuous variables. 
Sources:  See text.  29 
 
TABLE 4 
689 Mortgages Made In Kansas In 1887:  
Watkins' Brokered And Debenture Mortgages 
     
     
 
Brokered Mortgage 
Loans   
Loans Placed 
Behind Debenture 
           
Number of loans :   465  67.5%    224  32.5% 
 
   
     
Average  (s.d.): 
   
     
    Amount of loan ($)  $628  ( 355)    $536  ( 303 
) 
    Size of farm (acres)  145  ( 48 )    148  ( 32 ) 
    Debt per acre  $4.51  ( 2.20 )    $3.76  ( 2.07 
) 
    Miles from Watkins   245  ( 56 )    287  ( 66 ) 
 
   
     
Number of Loans: 
   
     
    Less than 5 years  31  6.7%    67  29.9% 
    Small loan (amount < $400)  77  16.6%    63  28.1% 
    Large loan (amount > $700)  100  21.5%    22  9.8% 
    Western Kansas   49  10.5%    84  37.5% 
    Quarter I  184  39.6%    59  26.3% 
    Quarter II  118  25.4%    14  6.3% 
    Quarter III  104  22.4%    45  20.1% 
    Quarter IV  59  12.7%    106  47.3% 
 
   
     
Average (s.d.): 
   
     
    Effective annual interest rate  10.09%  (1.10)   10.77%  (1.36) 
   Gross rate of return 
 
   
 
 
      Under contract to: 
 
   
 
 
       Loan Agents  0.55%  (0.26)    0.71%  (0.33) 
      Watkins  3.07%  (1.00)    4.05%  (1.17) 
       Investors  6.12%  (0.33)    5.54%  (0.50) 
Sources:  The number, amount and all lending terms for mortgages marketed by the 






Mortgage Rates and Foreclosure : 689 Kansas Loans  
      Effective  
 
Probit Model  
 
Mortgage Rate    of Foreclosure   
Variable  n=689 






 a    Coefficient  [s.e.]
 a  Effects
b 
                  Constant  8.34  **  (0.24)    -3.32  **  (0.68)  0.74 
                 
Debenture Loan  0.01   
(0.06)    -0.23   
(0.14)  -0.08 
                 
Loan Characteristics                 
Large Amount  -0.20  **  (0.07)    0.00   
(0.18)  0.00 
Small Amount  0.03   
(0.07)    -0.34  *  (0.17)  -0.13 
Short Maturity  0.39  **  (0.09)    -0.34   
(0.18)  -0.13 
Debt/Acre (ln)  -0.06   
(0.09)    1.18  **  (0.22)  0.43 
                 
Location Measures                   
Miles from Watkins (ln)  2.34  **  (0.18)    2.65  **  (0.58)  0.96 
Western Kansas   0.54  **  (0.09)    -0.17   
(0.24)  -0.06 
Newly Settled  0.48  **  (0.08)    1.19  **  (0.29)  0.37 
                 
Market Conditions                 
Watkins's Loans ($000)  -0.36  **  (0.06)    -0.45  *  (0.21)  -0.16 
Watkins's Foreclosure       0.08   
(0.07)    0.02   
(0.15)  0.01 
Loan by Big Agent  0.10   
(0.06)    0.05   
(0.13)  0.02 
Made in Quarter II  -0.31  **  (0.07)    0.20   
(0.16)  0.07 
Made in Quarter III  -0.63  **  (0.07)    -0.08   
(0.16)  -0.03 
Made in Quarter IV  -0.57  **  (0.07)    -0.15   
(0.15)  0.01 
                 
Post-1887 Conditions      
   
       
%Ch-Debt/Acre:1887-89 
   
    -0.61  **  (0.23)  -0.22 
%Ch-Acr in Debt 1887-89 
   
    -0.02   
(0.54)  -0.01 
                  R
2 - Pseudo R
2  0.74   
    0.238     
  Log Likelihood 
   
    -343.9   
 
  (F(14,674)/     156.8**   
         
  Chi2(13/9)                         
** denotes significance at 1 percent.  
*   denotes significance at 5 percent  
Notes: The table reports robust standard errors. Marginal effects for continuous variables are measured at 
their means with dummy variables set to zero.  Marginal effects for dummy variables for a change from 0 
to 1 at the means of the continuous variables.  





Debenture Status: 689 Kansas Loans  
 
Probit: Debenture = 1     (n=689)  
 
Full Information    Mortgage Papers Information 




 a    [s.e.]
 a  [s.e.]
 a 
Constant  -3.24  **    -2.88  **    ** 
 
(0.67)    
   
(0.58)    
     
Loan Characteristics               
Large Amount  -0.40  *    -0.38  **  -0.12  ** 
 
(0.19)    
   
(0.19)    
 
(0.05)    
 
Small Amount  0.52  **    0.53  **  0.19  ** 
 
(0.17)    
   
(0.16)    
 
(0.06)    
 
Short Maturity  1.06  **    1.07  **  0.40  ** 
 
(0.17)    
   
(0.17)    
 
(0.06)    
 
Debt/Acre (ln)  0.72  **    0.74  **  0.25  ** 
 
(0.22)    
   
(0.22)    
 
(0.07)    
 
Location Measures                 
Miles from Watkins (ln)  1.33  **    1.05  **  0.36  ** 
 
(0.49)    
   
(0.38)    
 
(0.13)    
 
Western Kansas   0.40      0.51  **  0.19  ** 
 
(0.20)    
   
(0.18)    
 
(0.07)    
 
Newly Settled  0.19             
 
(0.18)    
           
Market Conditions               
Watkins's Loans ($000)  0.18             
 
(0.20)    
           
Watkins's Foreclosure       0.21             
 
(0.16)    
           
Loan by Big Agent  -0.12             
 
(0.13)    
           
Made in Quarter II  -0.78  **    -0.77  **  -0.22  ** 
 
(0.18)    
   
(0.18)    
 
(0.04)    
 
Made in Quarter III  -0.01      0.02    0.01   
 
(0.16)    
   
(0.15)    
 
(0.05)    
 
Made in Quarter IV  0.89  **    0.92  **  0.34  ** 
 
(0.15)    
   
(0.15)    
 
(0.05)    
 
R
2 - Pseudo R
2  0.26      0.25   
 
 




2(13/9)     181.10  **     178.50  **       
** denotes significance at 1 percent.  
*   denotes significance at 5 percent  
Notes: The table reports robust standard errors. Marginal effects for continuous variables are measured at 
their means with dummy variables set to zero.  Marginal effects for dummy variables for a change from 0 
to 1 at the means of the continuous variables.  
Sources:  See the text.32 
 
TABLE 7   
Sources of Differences in Mortgage Rates and Gross Returns for Debenture and Brokered Loans     
(Predicted Differences Based on Hedonic Models for 689 Kansas Loans)
a  
  Difference Between Avg. Debenture and Brokered Loan
b: 
Variable  Effective    Gross Rate of Return under Contract to:    Mortgage   
 
Rate   
Loan 
Agents  Watkins  Investors 
 
         
Actual Difference in Average 
                      (Debenture Loan-Brokered Loans)    0.68 
 
  0.16  0.98     -0.58 
 
         
Predicted Difference Due To
c:           
 
          Differences in Average Loan Terms         0.13 ** 
 
0.07 **   0.06 *   0.00 
 
          Differences in Average Measures of 
Location        0.63 ** 
 
0.13 **   0.42 **  -0.02 
 
          Differences in Average Market 
Conditions       -0.09 ** 
 
-0.01 **  -0.04**      -0.03 ** 
 
          Debenture Status   0.01 
 
-0.03     0.54**      -0.53 ** 
                 
** denotes significance at 1 percent.  
*   denotes significance at 5 percent  
Notes:  The table reports the differences in predicted effects for the average debenture and the average brokered loans using the regression 
estimates reported in Appendix Table 1. The table reports the sum of the predicted effects for all variables within each group and the stars 
report tests of significance for these groups of variables. 
Sources:  Calculated from regressions reported in Appendix Table 1.  33 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 1 
Mortgage Rates and Gross Contract Returns to Agents, Watkins and Investors (n=689) 
      Effective   Agent's   Watkins's  Investors' 
Variable  Mortgage Rt.  Return  Return  Return 
 
[s.e.]
   [s.e.]
   [s.e.]
   [s.e.]
  
                  Constant  8.34   **  0.17   **  1.68   **  6.36   ** 
 
(0.24)     (0.06)     (0.31)  
 
(0.15)    
Debenture Loan  0.01      -0.03      0.54   **  -0.53   ** 
 
(0.06)     (0.02)     (0.07)     (0.04)    
Loan Characteristics             
 
Large Amount  -0.20   **  -0.04   **  -0.05      -0.03     
  (0.07)     (0.02)     (0.09)  
 
(0.05)    
Small Amount  0.03      0.01      0.12      -0.10   * 
  (0.07)     (0.02)     (0.09)     (0.05)    
Short Maturity  0.39   **  0.26   **  0.14      0.03     
  (0.09)     (0.04)     (0.09)  
 
(0.05)    
Debt/Acre (ln)  -0.06      0.00      -0.05      -0.04     
  (0.09)     (0.02)     (0.10)     (0.05)    
Location Measures               
 
Miles from Watkins (ln)  2.34   **  0.42   **  1.86   **  -0.10     
  (0.18)     (0.05)     (0.23)     (0.11)    
Western Kansas   0.54   **  0.18  **  0.06    0.03     
  (0.09)     (0.03)     0.10      (0.05)    
Newly Settled  0.47   **  0.05  *  0.44  **  -0.06     
  (0.08)     (0.02)     (0.09)  
 
(0.04)    
Market Conditions 
             
 
Watkins's Loans ($000)  -0.36   **  -0.09   **  -0.27   **  0.03     
  (0.06)     (0.02)     (0.09)     (0.05)    
Watkins's Foreclosure       0.08      0.01      -0.02      0.04     
  (0.07)     (0.02)     (0.08)     (0.04)    
Loan by Big Agent  0.10      0.08   **  -0.08      0.02     
  (0.06)     (0.02)     (0.06)     (0.03)    
Made in Quarter II  -0.31   **  -0.06   **  -0.05      -0.16   ** 
  (0.07)     (0.02)     (0.09)     (0.04)    
Made in Quarter III  -0.63   **  -0.07   **  -0.21   **  -0.27   ** 
  (0.06)     (0.02)     (0.07)     (0.04)    
Made in Quarter IV  -0.56   **  -0.06   **  -0.36   **  -0.15   ** 
 
(0.07)     (0.02)     (0.08)     (0.04)    
(R
2 )  0.74   
 
0.62      0.58      0.40     
(F(14/674))    156.80       73.40       73.20       23.6    
** denotes significance at 1 percent.  
*   denotes significance at 5 percent  
Notes:  The table reports robust standard errors. 
Sources: See the text. 
           
 